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Introduction
One of the major issues in climate change policy is how to deal with ubiquitous uncertainty: though much is known, nearly everything is uncertain. There are many uncertainties in the physical science of climate, including the likelihood of catastrophic or abrupt change. The costs of mitigation and adaptation are poorly known. The response of biologic systems to climate change is also uncertain. Finally, how society will respond either in terms of preventing change or in adapting to change is imperfectly understood.
Uncertainty is of course a fact of life and its existence should be no real obstacle to formulating sound public policy -policymakers can simply act on expectations. But what complicates things for climate policy is that uncertainty itself is changing -we are learning about the science and economics of the problem as time passes. Furthermore, we are taking active steps to increase our knowledge of the processes through significant R&D programs. In a decade we will be much better informed about the problem and in two decades, even better informed.
This process of learning raises an important timing question. On the one hand it can be argued that society should delay taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, until more is known. After all, if we act and subsequently learn that climate change is less serious than we had thought, we will have taken steps unnecessarily. On the other hand, if we do learn that climate change is more serious than we had thought, we can always accelerate action later. However it is often argued that this 'learnthen-act' approach only makes sense if the accumulation of greenhouse gas emissions is reversible, so that if we make a policy "mistake," we can 'undo' the effects of the decision. But the accumulation of greenhouse gases is often viewed as irreversible 1 , so that by the time we learn that climate change is a serious issue we may have built up such concentrations of greenhouse gases that we are faced with drastic consequences which cannot be readily undone.
This irreversibility in the climate process leads to calls for implementing a precautionary approach -that, far from delaying taking steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions while we wait for better information, we should take more steps now, to guard against getting bad news in the future and finding it is too late to do anything about it. However, there are other issues at play, including the irreversibility in accumulating emission control capital. Overall, the economics literature is ambiguous about the applicability of the precautionary principle to climate (see Kolstad, 1996b; .
There is one subtlety here that prompts this paper. We can be concerned with how uncertainty, learning and irreversibilities affect a single decision maker, and that is the focus of much of the relevant literature. A related, though fundamentally different, problem concerns how agents interact strategically in such an environment of uncertainty and learning. That is the subject of this paper. When uncertain, learning agents are strategically interacting in the context of negotiating an international environmental agreement (IEA), how do outcomes change in comparison with the certain, non-learning case? The problem is quite different. Some have argued (eg, Young, 1994 ) that uncertainty and learning facilitates agreement before negotiating positions become hardened by knowing exactly which particular agents win or loseuncertainty is liberating. Yet others (eg, Cooper, 1989) have suggested that it is only after uncertainty is largely resolved that countries will come together and agree to solve a global commons problem.
The goal of this paper is to better understand how uncertainty and learning affect the size and effectiveness of environmental agreements. One approach to this problem would be to construct a large complex model of agreement formation. The main problem with such an approach is that one gains realism at the expense of transparency. An alternative approach is to use a highly simplified model of strategic interaction in an attempt to better understand the basic forces at work when uncertainty and learning interact with self-interest and strategic interaction. Taking such a simplified approach allows deeper understanding of the underlying strategic forces involved, though at some sacrifice in predictive power. We take the later simplified path and extend the standard two-stage game theoretic model of such agreements first introduced by Barrett (1994) . To non-specialists, the framework may seem overly simplistic and a poor representation of the subtleties of crafting an international treaty. However, the goal of the paper is not to accurately represent the entire process of developing environmental treaties but rather to improve our understanding of the essential role of uncertainty and learning in shaping incentives to forge agreements. We seek to understand the underlying forces introduced by uncertainty and learning, rather than develop a predictive tool. Although a number of the results presented here have appeared elsewhere, this represents a new synthesis of knowledge on this important problem, aimed at a broader audience than the typical literature on international environmental agreements.
Background
The precautionary principle with respect to environmental protection roughly states that when environmental risks are uncertain, not well understood and irreversible, then regulatory actions should be biased towards avoiding those risks, rather than approaching the problem as a standard case of decision-making under uncertainty 2 . The precautionary principle has a good deal of intuitive appear and is often employed in debates on climate-change policy to support calls for increased immediate action by governments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, there is a substantial body of economics literature which shows that this simplistic version of the precautionary principle is not always a correct approach to climate change policy 3 . There are several arguments for such ambiguities.
At the most basic level, there are two different effects involved in the precautionary principle: the effect of the irreversibility of the accumulating stock of greenhouse gases, which does indeed imply cutting current greenhouse gas emissions relative to the case where there is no irreversibility; and the effect of learning, which has ambiguous effects on current emissions policy depending on factors such as the degree of relative risk aversion and the degree to which decision-makers are willing to substitute consumption now for consumption later (intertemporal substitution in consumption). showed that with the most standard model of climate change the learning effect implies that current emissions policy should be laxer than with no learning. A more readily appreciated argument is that in policy terms there are many quasi-irreversible stocks involved in climate change --stocks of greenhouse gases, stocks of capital which emit greenhouse gases and stocks of capital which reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. How uncertainty and learning affects emissions will depend on how it affects all these stocks, and they have different effects on emissions. Kolstad (1996b) examined the how the capital and greenhouse stocks interact and reached a conclusion similar to , that current emissions policy should be slightly laxer than the case with no learning. The arguments just cited assume that the only action that can be taken to address climate change is to reduce emissions (mitigation). But an important part of climate change policy is adaptation to a changed climate. If it is assumed that adaptation is not subject to irreversibility constraints, then allowing for adaptation (a substitute for mitigation) weakens the irreversibility effect . Of course an important question is how these ambiguities work out in empirical models of climatechange policy. survey the empirical literature and show that this literature does not provide much support for the precautionary principle.
In all of the above literature it is assumed that there is a single decision-maker, so the analysis is applicable to either an individual national government, or to a putative world government. Neither is directly relevant to climate change which is a global pollution problem that must be solved through negotiations among a large number of individual national governments acting in their own self-interest. In this case we are interested in what kinds of outcomes emerge from multiple independent countries negotiating in self-interest. In examining the outcome of such negotiations, we are interested in the size of successful agreements, as well as the aggregate emission reductions achieved.
In the context of multi-country agreements to address common environmental problems, Ulph and Ulph (1996) and Ulph and Maddison (1997) consider a twocountry model in which countries can either act non-cooperatively or cooperatively. They use this framework to compare outcomes with and without learning. They show that in the non-cooperative equilibrium the value of information may be negative if the uncertainty about damage costs is negatively correlated between countries 4 . In other words, being better informed can actually lead to an outcome that is collectively worse.
With only two countries, the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria are the only two possibilities. With more than two countries one can consider intermediate cases where some countries decide to join an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) in which signatories determine their emissions to maximize their collective selfinterest, while non-signatories act non-cooperatively. These agreements have come to be called self-enforcing agreements because joining or not joining such an agreement has to be in the interests of all countries and cannot be enforced by a supra-national body (since none exists).. Since the seminal papers by Barrett (1994) and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) , a large literature, both theoretical and empirical, has developed in this field 5 . Although concepts of the formation of cooperating blocs of countries (coalition formation) have become considerably more sophisticated, the issue of uncertainty and learning has been largely ignored, and there is an obvious additional question to be posed: how do uncertainty and the prospect of learning affect the incentives for countries to join an IEA?
To our knowledge the first paper to address this question is Na and Shin (1998) . They consider a three country model in which, ex ante, the countries have the same expected net benefits from emissions of a global flow pollutant. Uncertainty is about the distribution across the three countries of net benefits from emissions; total global net benefits are known with certainty. They employ a model of coalition formation which is a variant of the Barrett (1994) model in which countries first decide whether to join an IEA (the membership game), and then decide their emissions levels (the emissions game), and in both games they look for a Nash equilibrium (the Nash equilibrium of the membership game is often referred to as a stable IEA). Na and Shin consider two models of learning. With Uncertainty and No Learning, countries make both their membership decisions and their emissions decisions under uncertainty about the true state of the world. With Uncertainty and Complete Learning, countries make their membership and emissions decisions knowing the true state of the world. Na and Shin show that with Uncertainty and No Learning, the unique stable IEA of the membership game is the grand coalition of all three countries. With Complete Learning the grand coalition is never stable, and there will be either a two-country coalition, or not coalition at all. So in their model, learning is bad for cooperation.
A limitation of the Na and Shin model is that it is well known that for the particular model they employ, the maximum number of countries who will join an IEA is three (see Finus (2001) ). So the fact that Na and Shin can obtain the grand coalition as an outcome in the membership game is an artifact of their assumption that there are only three countries. To assess the impact of learning on IEA membership it would seem more sensible to employ a model with an arbitrary number of countries greater than three in which the number of signatories in equilibrium could also be greater than three. Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2006) employ a special case of the Barrett (1994) model in which the emission strategies are discrete, and for this model, as we shall see, the equilibrium of the membership game allows the size of a stable IEA to take any value between 2 and the grand coalition.
A second important difference between the model of Na and Shin and those of Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2006) is that in the latter models countries are identical ex ante and ex post, and uncertainty is about the unit damage cost from climate change, which is the same for all countries. So in this case uncertainty is about the global net benefits from emissions, but the distribution of these benefits across countries is known. While there are some differences between the models of Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2006) , there are some key common results, which are synthesized in our earlier paper Kolstad and Ulph (2006) 6 . We considered three possibilities for learning: Partial Learning in which countries learn the true state of the world after the membership game but before the emissions game; Complete Learning in which countries learn the true state of the world before the membership game; the base case comparison is No Learning, which effectively means that uncertainty is resolved after the emissions game. We showed that with Complete Learning, there are two possible outcomes, depending on the state of the world: one in which the number of signatories and the level of welfare is lower than with No Learning and the other in which the number of signatories and welfare is higher than with No Learning; however while the expected number of signatories would be higher than with No Learning, the expected level of welfare would be lower. Partial Learning results in two possible stable IEAs, the same two as with Complete Learning; however while the IEA with lower number of signatories and lower level of welfare than No Learning is always stable, the one with the higher number of signatories and higher welfare is stable only if the probability of low damage costs is sufficiently high. So as long as there is a significant risk of high damage costs, the only stable IEA with Partial Learning has a low number of signatories and low welfare. So both Complete and Partial Learning result lower expected welfare than with No Learning: the value of information is generally negative. Kolstad and Ulph (2006) considered the simple case of uncertainty about a variable that is common to all countries. Countries face the same expected damage costs, but there are only two possible states of the world -either all countries have high damage costs, or all have low damage costs, so countries are also identical ex post. We call this the case of common uncertainty. In this paper we consider the case where countries face individual uncertainty 7 . Countries are again ex ante identical since they face the same expected damage cost but now they each have the same independent probability of having high or low damage costs. This implies there are now many more states of the world 8 depending on how many countries turn out to have low damage costs (with the rest having high damage costs). So ex post in general there will be a mix of high and low cost countries. The greater richness of the states of the world with individual uncertainty than with common uncertainty leads to some significantly different outcomes, though the sizes of stable IEAs fall within the same range as with common uncertainty.
With Complete Learning there are three possible types of stable IEAs, depending on the number of high and low damage cost countries: Case 1. Most countries are low damage cost. The unique stable IEA has a number of signatories equal to the higher number of signatories as in common uncertainty, in which most of the signatories will be low damage costs countries, though there may also be few high cost countries; this stable IEA has higher welfare than No Learning. Case 2. Most countries are high damage cost. The unique stable IEA has a number of signatories equal to the lower number of signatories as in common 6 uncertainty; all of these signatories will be high damage cost countries, and welfare will be lower than with No Learning. Case 3. A mix of high and low damage cost countries . Depending on the total number of countries, there is either no stable IEA, or two stable IEAs, the ones identified in (i) and (ii). If the outcome is that there is no stable IEA, then expected welfare is lower with Complete Learning than with No Learning. If the outcome is that there are two stable IEAs, then if the stable IEA with higher welfare IEA is selected then expected welfare is higher with Complete Learning than No Learning.
Taking expectations over all possible outcomes for the number of high damage costs countries, expected welfare with Complete Learning is higher than with No Learning for a significant majority of parameter values, and this majority rises with the total number of countries.
With Partial Learning, it is difficult to obtain analytical results, but numerical simulations show that for the overwhelming majority of sets of parameter values there is a unique stable IEA, but in a small number of cases (5%) there may be 2 (and in a very few cases more than 2) stable IEAs. However in all cases, the size of the stable IEA is never greater than with No Learning and, even if we select the IEA with highest welfare when there are multiple stable IEAs, expected welfare with Partial Learning is always less than with either No Learning or Complete Learning.
In summary, allowing for individual uncertainty reinforces the result obtained with common uncertainty that expected welfare with Partial Learning is less than with No Learning, but with Complete Learning in the majority of cases expected welfare with Complete Learning is higher than with No Learning.
In the next section we set out the basic model and analyse the case where there is no uncertainty. Section 4 introduces uncertainty and considers the effect of learning, first for the case where there is common uncertainty (which just summarises our results from Kolstad and Ulph, 2006) and then for the case of individual uncertainty, which is the focus of this paper. Section 5 provides some numerical results where it has not been possible to derive results analytically.
The Model
Our general framework is that of N identical countries, indexed i = 1, …N. Country i's emissions are denoted q i , which for simplicity we assume can take one of two values: q i = 0 (abate) or q i = 1 (pollute). We denote by Country i's net benefits are ) (
where γ i denotes the amount of environmental damage a unit of emissions causes to country i relative to the private benefit of emitting a unit. Throughout total net benefit (or aggregate welfare) will be denoted by W: V summed over all countries.
At this stage we assume i i ∀ = γ γ , and that:
This assumption is fairly benign. If γ ≥ 1, this would mean the private benefit-cost ratio is greater than one and thus that all countries would unilaterally abate -not such an interesting case. As we will see, the case of γ ≤ 1/N is similarly uninteresting since in this case the benefit-cost ratio is so low that even in a fully cooperative case, with all countries in an agreement, abating is not desirable.
We will be examining four fundamentally different versions of this basic model
• Furthermore, we will be interested in net benefits to individual countries and aggregate welfare. Finally, we shall consider three modes of strategic interaction between countries situations: no cooperation, complete cooperation, and a cooperative agreement of a subset of countries, i.e. an IEA.
Finally, we consider two kinds of uncertainty -uncertainty regarding a common parameter and uncertainty about an individual parameter that may be different from country to country. In both cases, the parameter is drawn from a single distribution, known to all. In the case of the common uncertainty, whatever parameter value is realized when uncertainty is resolved will be the same for all countries. In the case of individual uncertainty, countries take an individual and uncorrelated draw from the distribution to determine the parameter value they face.
In the rest of this section we shall consider the version of the basic model with No Uncertainty. In Section 4 we shall introduce uncertainty and the three different forms of learning set out above. To assist the reader, Table I provides a glossary of the various variables that we introduce in this paper.
No Uncertainty -Non-Cooperation and Complete Cooperation

Non-cooperative Equilibrium
Country i takes as given emissions of other countries, Q i , and chooses own-emissions, q i , to maximize net benefits, V i . From Assumption 1 we immediately derive:
Lemma 1 In the non-cooperative equilibrium with no uncertainty, all countries pollute ( i q i ∀ = , 1 ) and aggregate world net benefit is W = N(1-γN) < 0.
Co-operative Equilibrium
The N countries choose q 1 , …, q N to maximize
Assumption 1 we immediately derive:
Lemma 2 In the cooperative equilibrium with no uncertainty, i q i ∀ = , 0 , and aggregate world net benefit is W = 0.
No Uncertainty -International Environmental Agreement
In this case, joining a coalition is voluntary -some countries may join, others may not. Following Barrett (1994) and others, we model this as a two-stage game. In stage 1, (membership game) each country decides whether or not to join the agreement (an IEA). The result of this is a set of signatories to the IEA and a set of fringe members, outside the IEA. We seek a Nash equilibrium in "announcements" (ie, "in" or "out") in which no country wishes to unilaterally leave or join the coalition. In stage 2, (emission game) each non-signatory, or fringe, country, denoted by superscript f, takes as given the emissions of all other countries and chooses its emissions to maximize its individual net benefit; the signatory countries, denoted by superscript s, collectively choose their emissions to maximize the aggregate net benefit of the signatory countries taking as given the emissions of the non-signatories. The outcome of the stage 2 game is a Nash equilibrium in which each non-signatory acts noncooperatively while the signatories to the IEA act collectively with respect to each other, but non-cooperatively with respect to the non-signatories. Definition 1. Define the function I(x) as the smallest integer greater than or equal to 1/x.
The following result follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 3 (Emission Game Equilibrium)
Given N countries, of which n ≥ 2 are signatories to an IEA, non-signatory countries always pollute. If n ≥ I(γ) , all signatory countries abate, and the net benefits to a signatory and non-signatory country respectively are:
If n < I(γ), all signatory countries pollute and the net benefit to a signatory and nonsignatory country respectively will be
Non-signatory countries always pollute for the same reason as in the non-cooperative equilibrium: it is a dominant strategy. Signatory countries know this, and each signatory country abates as long as the benefit it would get from emitting one unit of pollution (1) is less than the damage that it would cause to all signatory countries (nγ).
There are two ways of defining the equilibrium of the membership game. The first, as presented in Barrett (1994) borrows the concept of a stable coalition from the literature on oligopoly and defines a stable IEA as follows:
Definition 2: An IEA with n signatories is stable if it satisfies the two conditions:
i.e. no signatory country has any incentive to unilaterally leave the IEA, and no nonsignatory has any incentive to unilaterally join the IEA, taking as given the membership decisions of all other countries. This definition is equivalent to saying that a stable IEA is a Nash equilibrium of the membership game. Other authors have come up with more complex conditions for stability of an IEA (eg, Chander and Tulkens, 1994) , including ways of committing countries to participate (eg, Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993) . What this definition of stability gives us is a very basic, and perhaps weakest, concept of what it takes to hold an agreement together. It is a good starting point for explorations of the size of voluntary international environmental agreements.
The following is a basic result on the size of an IEA:
Lemma 4 (Membership Game Equilibrium) The unique stable abating IEA of the membership game has n* = I(γ) signatory countries with aggregate world net benefit of W(n*) = (N-n*)(1-Nγ) < 0.
The intuition is straightforward. No IEA with n > n* signatories is internally stable.
In such a case, there is an incentive for a signatory country to quit the IEA, because if it does so there will still be at least n* counties in the IEA and thus the remaining members will continue to abate. Consequently, by quitting it gains 1 in benefit and loses γ in additional damage costs, and so the gain outweighs the cost. However when there are only n* signatories, if one signatory country leaves the IEA the remaining countries will choose to pollute; thus the defector will gain 1 and lose n*γ, and by definition of n* the loss outweighs the gain. So n* is a stable IEA. For all n < n*, signatories will pollute and all countries get the non-cooperative payoff, which is the same for all n < n*. By the definition of stability, no such IEA can be internally or externally stable. So n* is the unique stable IEA.
Aggregate world net benefits from the stable IEA, W(γ), lie between the aggregate net benefits of the non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria (from Lemmas 1 & 2). We define three measures of gain: the full gain from cooperation (FGC), defined as the difference between aggregate net benefits in the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibrium; the absolute partial gain from cooperation (APGC), defined as the difference in aggregate net benefits between the net benefits of the stable IEA and the net benefits in the non-cooperative equilibrium; and the relative partial gain in cooperation (RPGC), defined as APGC as a proportion of FGC, i.e. a measure of how much of the maximum potential gains in cooperation are realised by the IEA.:
Note that while FGC and APGC are increasing in γ, since n* is decreasing in γ, RPGC is decreasing in γ. In other words, the more an environmental problem needs solving (higher γ), and hence the greater are potential gains from cooperation, the lower is the fraction of those potential gains that an IEA will achieve -a discouraging result.
To complete this section it is worth noting the properties of I(γ)). If we approximate I(γ) ≈ 1/γ, and thus assume it is differentiable, then it is straightforward to see that I(γ) is a decreasing and convex function, and W(n)≈W(1/γ), viewed as a function of γ, is a decreasing and concave function 9 . Of course, more precisely, I(γ) is an integer function, and not differentiable, and so is not strictly a convex function (and similarly for W). For the purposes we need for this paper we shall assume that we can treat I(γ) as convex.
Uncertainty and Learning
In this section we introduce into our model uncertainty in the benefit-cost ratio (γ i ) facing each country, and then superimpose several types of learning on the model. We shall consider two treatments of uncertainty: common uncertainty, in which all countries realise the same v alu e of γ i ; individual uncertainty in which different countries realise different values of γ i .
Introducing Uncertainty and Learning
Uncertainty
We assume that γ can take just one of two values: γ l -low damage costs; or γ h -high damage costs. The probability that damage costs are low is p and thus the probabilaity that they are high is 1-p. This distribution is known to all. We consider two possible structures of uncertainty across countries:
Common Uncertainty: with probability p all countries have parameter value γ l and with probability (1 -p) all countries have parameter value γ h .
Individual Uncertainty: For each country i = 1, …, N there is an independent probability p that γ i = γ l and a probability (1 -p) that γ i = γ h . Ex post, let N h be the
number of countries which have high damage costs, and N l (= N -N h ) be the number with low damage costs.
In the case of common uncertainty there are just two possible states of the world. In the case of individual uncertainty, there are N + 1 possible states of the world, N h = 0, 1, 2, …, N. The probability that the state of the world with N h high damage cost countries will arise is the probably of exactly N h successes (probability 1-p) in N Bernoulli trials, and is given by:
In the cases of both common uncertainty and individual uncertainty we make the following assumption:
This assumption is simply a variant on Assumption 1 (Eqn. 2). We now define the expected damage cost for each country:
and the following shorthand:
Eq. (8b) indicates the number signatories that would arise from an IEA if it were known for certain that all countries had damage costs equal to low damage costs, expected damage costs and high damage costs respectively.
We want to ensure that uncertainty matters, i.e. that
are sufficiently distinct from each other that the resulting stable IEAs would have distinctly different membership sizes and different aggregate world net benefits; so we make the following assumption:
From which it follows that the world net benefits from different coalition sizes are
Learning
To introduce the possibility of learning we assume that learning takes the form of perfect learning -i.e. the true state of the world is revealed to all countries. Again this is a very special model of learning. The crucial issue is the timing at which such information becomes available, and we define three possible cases:
No Learning: the true state of the world is revealed to all countries after all their decisions (membership and emissions) have been taken.
Complete Learning: the true state of the world is revealed to all countries before any decision is taken, in particular before the membership decision is taken.
Partial Learning: the true state of the world is revealed to all countries after the membership game but before the emissions game.
It could be argued that the most relevant models of learning for climate change just now are No Learning and Partial Learning.
Uncertainty and Learning with No Cooperation and Complete Cooperation
Before considering the effect of uncertainty and learning on IEAs, we consider their effect on equilibria for the purely non-cooperative and purley cooperative cases. Note that for these equilibria the only relevant models of learning are No Learning and Complete Learning. By Assumption 2 and the arguments in Lemmas 1 and 2, we immediately derive: Proposition 1. Uncertainty (common or individual) and learning (complete or none) have no effect on the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria. There are no gains from learning in these cases.
In the non-cooperative equilibrium, all countries always pollute both in the case of No Learning and in the case of Complete Learning, no matter what state of the world is revealed, and so expected aggregate net benefits are N(1 -N γ ). Similarly, in the cooperative equilibrium all countries always abate, for all types of uncertainty and learning, no matter what state of the world is revealed, and so expected aggregate net benefits again are 0. Note that this result is in stark contrast to those in Ulph and Ulph (1996) , Ulph and Maddison (1997) , and Baker (2005) , where learning does affect the outcome of both the non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria, and where the degree of correlation between damage costs in different countries plays an important role.
However, as we shall see, uncertainty and learning do have important effects on outcomes with IEA formation. Thus our model of uncertainty and learning has successfully isolated effects of uncertainty and learning that work solely through the structure of the IEA games.
Uncertainty, Learning and IEAs -Common Uncertainty
In this section we consider common uncertainty and analyse in turn the three cases of No Learning, Partial Learning and Complete Learning. For each of these cases we shall be concerned with two results: the number of signatories of an IEA (n) and expected world net benefits associated with the IEA (W). To assist the reader with notation, these values will be denoted by (n*, W*) for the case of No Learning ( 
Common Uncertainty with No Learning
Given that the net benefit function is linear in γ, certainty equivalence applies, so when countries take their decisions in the membership game and the emissions game using expected net benefits, it is equivalent to the model of certainty in Section 2, with known unit damage cost equal to γ , expected unit damage cost. Thus from Lemma 4 we have:
Proposition 2 With Common Uncertainty and No Learning the unique stable IEA has: n* = I( γ ) (10a) signatories, and aggregate world net benefits are:
Common Uncertainty with Complete Learning
In this case the true state of the world is revealed before countries decide whether or not to join an IEA. So if the state of the world revealed is that all countries have low (high) damage costs, then we can apply the certainty analysis of Lemma 4 to argue that the unique stable IEA will have ) ( * * h l n n members. Using Assumption 3, it immediately follows that: . `
We stated at the end of section 3 that we shall assume that the integer-valued function I(γ) may be treated as if it is convex, and W(1/γ), as if it is concave in γ, which is likely to be justifiable given our Assumption 3 that uncertainty is sufficiently great. So we immediately conclude that * n n > , * W W < .
Corollary 1. Thus we have shown that with complete learning more information leads to lower expected aggregate world net benefits. The intuition for this follows from the intuition we gave earlier for the fact that aggregate world welfare with an IEA is a decreasing concave function of unit damages: if the number of signatories of an IEA stayed constant as unit damage costs increased, and hence the overall level of emissions stayed the same as the unit damage costs increased, then aggregate world net benefits would be a decreasing linear function of unit damage costs, for the simple reason that we assume damage costs are a linear function of the unit damage cost parameter. But there is the further indirect effect that as unit damage costs increases, the number of signatories of an IEA decreases, and hence aggregate emissions increase. This reinforces the direct effect of an increase in unit damage costs to make welfare a decreasing and concave function of unit damage costs. Thus expected aggregate world net benefits when the true value of unit damage costs is revealed prior to the membership game are less than aggregate world net benefits based on the expected level of unit damage costs.
Common Uncertainty with Partial Learning
We now suppose that the true state of the world is revealed after countries decide whether to join an IEA but before they choose their emission strategies, so it is now possible for countries to condition their emissions on the state of the world.
By Assumption 2 and Lemma 3, it is straightforward to derive:
Lemma 5 (Emission Game -Partial Learning) With Common Uncertainty and Partial Learning, non-signatory countries always pollute no matter what the true state of the world or the number of signatories (n). The emission strategies of signatories, and expected net benefits of signatories and non-signatories are as follows: (i) for n ≥ * l n , signatories abate in both states of the world and expected net benefits are:
(ii) for n < * h n , signatories pollute in both states of the world, and expected net benefits are: γ 
By the arguments given for Lemma 4, it is straightforward to see that no IEA with membership strictly greater than * l n could be stable (each signatory country has an incentive to quit), and no IEA with membership strictly less than * h n could be stable (the IEA is trivial since no abatement ever occurs and members have no incentive to stay in the agreement). It is also straightforward to see that no IEA with membership lying strictly between * h n and * l n could be stable. This is because signatory countries have a reason to quit for the same reason as before. If a signatory country quits, it knows that the remaining signatories will continue to abate in the high damage cost state, so by quitting it gains the benefit of polluting in the high damage cost state (a benefit of 1), but only adds one unit of pollution in that state, costing h γ , and by Assumption 2, the gain outweighs the loss. It is only when membership drops to * h n members that we get stability, because then signatories are pivotal: if one signatory was to leave the IEA, then all signatories would now pollute in the high damage cost state, a cost of This leaves the case of an IEA with membership * l n . Signatories abate in all states, so if one signatory were to leave, it would get the benefit of polluting in all states, an expected benefit of 1. However in the low damage cost state all the previous signatories will now pollute and in the high damage cost state it will now pollute, so the expected cost of defecting is , for large enough values of p the expected damage cost of quitting the IEA could exceed the benefit of quitting, and so an IEA with * l n members would also be stable.
To be more precise, define 
As we will see in the next proposition, p crit is the critical value of the probability of the low damage state (p) such that for all p≥p crit an IEA with membership * l n is also stable. We thus have: Proposition 4. With Common Uncertainty and Partial Learning and p crit defined in Eqn (12), if p < p crit , then there is a unique stable IEA with membership * h n and aggregate world expected net benefits of: Assumption 3 rules out the possibility of very high or very low values of p, which may rule out the second stable IEA with Partial Learning, depending on parameter values.
We summarise the results for the case of Common Uncertainty focusing on the central case where p < p crit , so there is a unique stable IEA with Partial Learning. With Common Uncertainty, Partial Learning results in lower IEA membership size and lower aggregate world net benefits than with either No Learning or Complete Learning; Complete Learning leads to higher expected membership but lower expected aggregate world net benefits than with No Learning. Learning, whether Partial or Complete, reduces expected aggregate world net benefits relative to No Learning; information has negative value.
Uncertainty, Learning and IEAs -Individual Uncertainty
We now turn to the case of individual uncertainty -where each country faces the uncertainty of having high or low damages independent of the damage costs of other countries. As in the previous sub-section, we analyse in turn the three cases of No Learning, Complete Learning and Partial Learning. To summarise the results that will follow, with individual uncertainty and no learning the size of the IEA and aggregate world net benefits are the same as with common uncertainty and no learning, namely (n*, W*) -Props. 2 and 5. With individual uncertainty and complete learning there may be one, two or no stable IEAs depending on the total number of countries, N, and the number of countries who have high damage costs, N h , but if there is a stable IEA it will be of size either n l * or n h * ; aggregate world net benefits will be denoted by ) ( h N W (Prop. 6). Finally, for the case of individual uncertainty and partial learning we must rely on numerical simulations to obtain definitive results on the size of stable IEAs and resulting aggregate world net benefits (section 5).
4.3.1Individual Uncertainty with No Learning
As with Common Uncertainty, in both the emissions game and the membership game certainty equivalence applies and each country acts as if known damage costs were equal to expected damage costs, γ , and so we obtain the analogous result to Proposition 2:
Proposition 5. With Individual Uncertainty and No Learning the unique stable IEA has n* =I( γ ) signatories and aggregate world net benefits are W* = (N -n*)(1γ N) < 0.
Emissions Game for Complete and Partial Learning
We now have to allow for the fact that if information about players is revealed before they make their emissions decisions, then almost all states of the world will involve a mix of high and low damage cost countries. We know from Assumption 2 that nonsignatory countries will always pollute, no matter what their damage costs are revealed to be. But we need to analyse the emissions strategy of signatory countries for an arbitrary mix of high and low damage cost countries.
Notationally, things get a little more complicated. The emissions game involves actions conditioned on the size of the agreement/coalition. Previously the size of the coalition was sufficient to describe it. Now we are concerned not only with the size of the coalition but the mix of high and low cost countries in the coalition. Specifically, the coalition is described by (n,n h ), where n is the total number of countries in the coalition and n h is the number of high damage cost countries in the coalition.
For any number of signatories, n ≥2, of whom n h have high damage costs (0 ≤ n h ≤ n) define:
In the above, ) , ( h n n γ is the average damage cost of the signatories, and ) (n n h is the minimum number of high damage cost countries in an IEA of size n which ensures that the signatories will all abate. Since the signatories choose emissions to maximize their collective net benefits, they act as if all signatories had damage costs equal to ) , ( h n n γ and so we get immediately:
Lemma 6a
With Individual Uncertainty and Complete or Partial Learning, a group of n signatories with n h high damage cost members will abate if 1 ) , ( ≥ h n n nγ i.e. ) (n n n h h ≥ and will pollute otherwise.
It is straightforward to see that ) (n n h is decreasing in n and that (i) , then signatories will abate and the net benefits to signatory and non-signatory countries are:
Note that this is a more general emission strategy for signatories than in the case of Common Uncertainty and Partial Learning as set out in Lemma 5. Outside the range * * l h n n n < ≤ the strategies are the same. Inside the range * * l h n n n < ≤ we can think of the strategy for signatories in the case of common uncertainty as a special case of the strategy with individual uncertainty. With common uncertainty there are only two possible states of the world: either all countries have high damage costs, in which case ) (n n n n h h > =
, and the signatories abate, or all countries have low damage costs, in which case ) ( 0 n n n h h < = and the signatories pollute. This concludes the analysis of the emission game with Complete and Partial Learning. We now turn to the membership games.
Membership Game with Complete Learning
Recall that while Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that
, the distribution of the countries between high and low cost depends on the state of the world. There are N + 1 possible states of the world, depending on the number of countries with low-damage costs, N l , and hence corresponding number of countries with high damage costs, N h = N -N l . Before categorizing the stable IEAs that can arise in each possible state of the world, we need to introduce some new definitions.
First we need to extend the definition of a stable IEA to recognize both that in each state of the world there will be a specific number of high and low cost countries available, and that in general any potential set of signatories will contain both high and low cost signatories. the possible stable IEAs. In doing so we need to introduce the following definition of a minimum number of low cost countries necessary to generate a stable IEA: (which may be zero), are high cost, will be stable, the signatories will abate and aggregate welfare in that state will be:
(ii) if condition B holds then an IEA with * h n signatories, all of whom are high cost, will be stable, the signatories will abate, and aggregate welfare in that state is
if neither conditions A nor B hold, then there is no stable IEA, the outcome is the non-cooperative equilibrium in which all countries pollute and aggregate welfare for that state is
The proof is in Appendix 1. Before providing the intuition, it is worth noting the following implications of Proposition 6. Note first that if * h l n N N + < there will some states of the world for which the condition for 6(iii) holds, so there is no stable IEA, and the outcome is the non-cooperative equilibrium, an outcome worse than any in the case of Perfect Correlation. Second, if 1 ) 1 ( * ≥ − l h n n then 6(i) can have multiple stable IEAs all of size * l n , but with between 0 and ) 1 ( * − l h n n high cost countries and the rest low cost. However welfare is the same irrespective of the number of high cost signatories. Third, if * h l n N N + ≥ then there are no states of the world for which the condition for 6(iii) holds but there will be states of the world for which the conditions for both 6(i) and 6(ii) hold, so again there will be multiple stable IEAs. Finally, note that the possibility of multiple stable IEAs means we cannot assign a unique outcome and hence a unique aggregate welfare level for each state of the world, and hence we cannot compute expected welfare for the Complete Learning case. We discuss how we resolve this issue in Section 5.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 6, assume that
IEA with * l n n > signatories can be stable, because, by Lemma 6, if one country left, signatories would continue to abate, and it would therefore always pay a country, of either type, to leave. If there are * l n signatories, of whom at most ) 1 ( * − l h n n , possibly zero, are high cost, then, again by Lemma 6, the defection of any country will cause all remaining signatories to pollute and this is a sufficient threat to make such an IEA stable. Any IEA of size n lying strictly between * h n and * l n cannot be stable. If ) (n n n n h h ≥ > , so the signatories abate, then any low cost country will leave, since even if that triggers the remaining signatories to pollute, the gain from being able to pollute outweighs the damage cost, since * l n n < . If n h = n, then any high cost country will defect since it knows remaining countries will abate. Finally if ) (n n n h h < , so signatories pollute, it will pay a high cost country to join the IEA, since if this means signatories continue to pollute it is no worse off by joining, while if it induces signatories to abate, it is strictly better off since * h n n > . This leaves an IEA with IEA with * h n countries, all high cost, as a stable IEA, by the arguments behind Lemma 4. So in this case there are multiple stable IEAs, as given in 6(i) and 6(ii).
, this eliminates the first type of stable IEA, 6(i). If * h h n N < this rules out the stable IEA of type 6(ii). If both are true, there is no stable IEA, and the outcome is the non-cooperative equilibrium.
In comparison with the case of Complete Learning with Perfect Correlation, the richer set of states of the world with No Correlation results in a richer set of possible stable IEAs. However the possibility of multiple stable IEAs for any given state of the world, makes the calculation of the expected size of IEAs and expected welfare impossible without some criterion for selecting between the different stable IEAs.
Membership Game with Partial Learning
At the membership game stage, countries do not know their type, and need to calculate expected payoffs for a typical signatory and non-signatory country for any given size of IEA, using Lemma 6 to identify the emission strategies of signatories. From Lemma 6, countries know: (i) if * l n n ≥ then signatories will abate; (ii) if * h n n < then signatories will pollute; (iii) if * * l h n n n < ≤ then signatories will abate if ) (n n n h h ≥ and pollute otherwise. In the first two cases it is straightforward for countries to work out what the expected payoffs will be if an IEA of size n is formed. For the last case we need a few more definitions to allow countries to compute the expected payoffs for signatories and non-signatories.
Starting from an IEA of n members, the random variable that is the number of members that are high cost is distributed as binomial. In particular, for any n such that * * l h n n n < ≤ , the probability that exactly i of these countries will be high cost is the same as the probability of i successes in n independent Bernoulli trials (two discrete outcomes), where a success is defined as a high cost draw (probability 1-p). Notationally, we define ) , ( n i φ as the probability of having i out of the n countries turn out to be high cost countries, for any i such that n i ≤ ≤ 0 ; next we define the complementary cumulative distribution function as
, which is the probability that the signatories will abate, i.e. the probability that at least ) (n n h out of n countries turn out to be high cost countries; and finally we define
as the expected damage cost that will be saved by each of the n signatories when they do indeed abate. Then we have:
Lemma 7 With Individual Uncertainty and Partial Learning, the expected payoffs to signatory and non-signatory countries for any number of signatories, n, are as follows:
If we compare these expected payoffs with those that arise in the case of Common Uncertainty, i.e. compare Lemma 7 and Lemma 5, we see that in cases (i) and (ii) the outcomes are identical, which is not surprising since the emission decisions of signatories in these cases do not depend on the state of the world. In case (iii) the comparison of expected payoffs are:
These have the same structure. With both Common Uncertainty and Individual Uncertainty, and for both signatories and non-signatories, the first two terms, γ N − 1 , represent the expected payoffs in the non-cooperative equilibrium. The remaining terms represent the net gains from forming an IEA, relative to the payoffs in the noncooperative equilibrium. Thus the third term, for signatories and non-signatories, is the expected net savings to each country in damage costs when the n signatories abate: with Common Uncertainty signatories abate only when damage costs turn out to be high, so expected savings are n(1-p)γ h ; while with Individual Uncertainty signatories abate only if there are at least ) (n n h high cost signatories and the expected savings are therefore ) ( n nγ . Finally, for signatories the fourth term represents the expected loss of output to each signatory when they have to abate, which is given by the probability that signatories abate, which is (1 -p) with Common Uncertainty and φ(n) with Individual Uncertainty. However while the structure of the payoffs is the same for Common Uncertainty and Individual Uncertainty, they are different functions, representing the richer sets of state in which signatories abate with Individual Uncertainty.
These differences in payoffs suggests that the results of the stability analysis would be different between Individual Uncertainty and Common Uncertainty, and this is indeed the case. We have the following.
Lemma 8 With Individual Uncertainty and Partial Learning, no IEA with n members such that * l n n > or n < * h n can be stable.
This just follows for the same reasons as with Lemma 4: for * l n n > any signatory knows that if it leaves the IEA the remaining signatories will continue to abate, and so it pays to leave, while for n < * h n signatories will pollute, so a country is as well off joining an IEA as staying out.
However this is as far as we have been able to proceed analytically. Lemma 8 cannot tell us whether there exists a stable IEA, whether there exist multiple stable IEAs, and how any such stable IEAs compare with the three candidates for stable IEAs so far identified in this paper, * * *, , l h n n n . In the next section we present results of some numerical simulations which show (i) for all of the sets of parameter values we study there always exists a stable IEA, and in 99.5% of cases it is unique, but in 0.5% of cases there are 2 stable IEAs; (ii) in 90.1% of cases the stable IEA is , * h n but in the remaining 9.9% of cases the stable IEA lies strictly between * h n and n*. As we discussed in the case of Complete Learning, the existence of multiple stable IEAs means we cannot compute expected aggregate welfare for Partial Learning and Individual Uncertainty. We shall also resolve this issue using the numerical simulations we report in the next section.
Numerical Simulations
The analysis in Section 4.3 was not able to determine analytically two issues: (i) what are the stable IEAs for Individual Uncertainty and Partial Learning; (ii) for Individual Uncertainty what are the expected welfare comparisons between No Learning, Partial Learning and Complete Learning. We have therefore used numerical simulations to shed light on these issues, and we report on these in turn. To provide a benchmark, we refer to the summary at then end of the Common Uncertainty section, 4.2. In the central case where p < p crit , so with Common Uncertainty and Partial Learning there is a unique stable IEA, expected welfare is highest with No Learning, next highest with Complete Learning and lowest with Partial Learning; while the expected size of an IEA is highest with Complete Learning, next highest with No Learning and lowest with Partial Learning. This section shows how robust these predictions are to the introduction of Individual Uncertainty.
Stable IEAs for Individual Uncertainty and Partial Learning
To this point there have been three candidates for a stable IEA:
in which signatories abate. That we have not been able to determine analytically what the stable IEAs might be for the case of Individual Uncertainty and Partial Learning is in part explained by the fact that numerical simulations we have conducted have revealed that there can be multiple stable IEAs, and that in general the stable IEAs need not be any of the three candidate values identified in the previous cases. We now describe the results of these numerical simulations.
For the numerical analysis of stable IEAs with Individual Uncertainty and Partial Learning the three key parameters are p, γ l , γ h . We have conducted a Monte Carlo simulation over values of pε[0,1], γ h ε[1/N,1] and γ l ε[1/N, γ . This reduced the number of combinations of parameter values we could use to 26235, 82% of the full set of possible combinations. Finally in applying our stability criteria (Definitions 1 and 2) , which use strict inequalities between the relevant payoffs of signatories and non-signatories, we have applied a 'trembling hand' criterion to rule out virtual equality between the payoffs. So, for example, for Internal
Stability
where τ is a very small number (10 -15 ); that is, the difference between the payoff a signatory gets from staying in the IEA and the payoff it would get if it left the IEA must be strictly positive in the sense of being greater than τ times the average of the absolute values of the two payoffs. For each of 100,000 randomly chosen sets of parameter values, excluding those which do not meet the criteria mention above, we have calculated the stable IEAs with Individual Uncertainty and Partial Learning. 10
The results can be summarized as follows. In less than 1% of the cases there was no stable IEA. In the remaining cases, in 94% there was a unique stable IEA; in 5% of cases there were 2 stable IEAs. A very few had three or four stable IEAs, though those may be attributable to numerical issues. In terms of the size of the stable IEAs, in all of the cases, the number of members of stable IEA was between * h n and n*.
For the cases with a unique IEA, over two thirds of the cases were for a size of * h n .
For the cases with two stable IEAs, in most cases one was of size * h n and the other was strictly between * h n and n*. Thus in our simulations, the size of the stable IEA with Individual Uncertainty and Partial Learning is always less than with Individual Uncertainty and No Learning. This is the same result as with Common Uncertainty and Partial Learning, given that with our parameter values p < p crit , , but whereas with Common Uncertainty and Partial Learning 100% of cases would have membership equal to * h n , with Individual Uncertainty and Partial Learning only 70% of stable IEAs had membership equal to * h n , while 30% of cases have IEA membership higher than * h n , but still less than n*.
Comparison of Aggregate Expected Welfare with Individual Uncertainty and No
Learning, Partial Learning and Complete Learning 10 With 100,000 Monte Carlo trials, 16,322 passed all of our criteria for parameter values and ranges. Of these, 0.95% had no equilibria, 94.27% had one equilibrium, 4.69% had two equilibria, 0.09% had three equilibria and 0.01% had four equilibria. Of the cases with one equilibrium, 72% of the equilibria are at * h n , 27% strictly between * h n and n* and 0.1% at n*. Of the cases with two equilibra, 42% of the equilibra are at * h n , 56% are strictly between * h n and n* and 1.5% are at n*.
We noted in Section 4 that with Individual Uncertainty the existence of multiple stable IEAs for both Partial Learning and Complete Learning made it impossible to calculate expected welfare for these two cases and compare expected welfare with No Learning. In this section we describe how we resolve the issue of multiple stable IEAs and then use numerical simulations to compare world net welfare under the three different learning regimes.
With No Learning we know that the unique stable IEA has n* signatories and aggregate expected welfare W* = (N-n*) (1-N γ ) .
In the case of Partial Learning, if there is more than one stable IEA we simply selected the stable IEA with highest expected welfare. Denote the size of that stable IEA by ñ with associated aggregate expected welfare, from Lemmas 7 and 8, given
For Complete Learning, state-dependent welfare is a function of the number of high cost countries (Prop. 6). Again, if for any value of N h there are multiple stable IEAs we have selected the one with higher world welfare. Recall also that from Proposition 6(i), where the stable IEA has * l n signatories, there could be potentially be a small number of high cost signatories, and so there could be multiple stable IEAs depending on precisely how many high cost signatories there might be. Since this has no welfare significance, we shall simply assume that all * l n signatories are low cost.Expected welfare involves taking an expectation over these states, using the probability of N h high cost countries out of N countries, as the probability of N h successes out of N Bernoulli trials. Table II shows the results of Monte Carlo simulations, as described earlier. 11 In this case, we conduct the simulations for different N (total numbers of countries). We are interested in the size of agreements for the three different kinds of learning, as well as overall welfare. Table II shows that the results for Individual Uncertainty confirm the findings for Common Uncertainty with respect to expected welfare for Partial Learning: for nearly all cases, expected welfare with Partial Learning is strictly lower than with either No Learning or Complete Learning. For Complete Learning, however, in a majority of cases expected welfare with Complete Learning is higher than with No Learning orPartial Learning, which is contrary to the case with Common Uncertainty where expected welfare with Complete Learning is always less than expected welfare with No Learning. Futhermore, as the number of countries increases, the ordering of welfare for the three types of learning appears to asymptote to complete learning giving highest expected welfare and partial learning the lowest.
The results for expected size of IEA with Individual Uncertainty broadly mirror the results for expected welfare. The rationale is, as noted in section 3, that IEAs do not necessarily bring significant welfare gains over the Non-Cooperative equilibrium. 11 For each column shown in the Table, 10,000 Monte Carlo runs were conducted, resulting in 700-1600 valid combinations of parameter values (smaller number for smaller N).
Asymptotically, it would appear that complete learning gives the largest IEA, whereas partial learning yields the lowest.
Conclusions
In this paper we have extended our earlier work on the formation of international environmental agreements under uncertainty and different models of learning to allow for information to reveal differences between countries. In the case of Partial Learning, which, as indicated in Section 3, we consider to be the more relevant model of learning just now for issues such as climate change, our analysis shows that expected IEA membership may be somewhat higher with Individual Uncertainty than with Common Uncertainty and, with Individual Uncertainty, may be higher than with Complete Learning, though always less than with No Learning. However, it remains the case that, just as with Common Uncertainty, with Individual Uncertainty expected welfare with Partial Learning is always less than with either No Learning or Complete Learning. For the more plausible model of learning, Partial Learning, our analysis suggests that our finding in the case of Common Uncertainty that information can have negative social value is robust when we allow information to reveal differences between countries. To non-economists it may seem strange that information can have negative value, since for a single decision-maker information cannot have negative value, because it can always be ignored. However economists have long been aware that when there are strategic interactions between a number of decision-makers responding to information, these strategic interactions can give information a negative value.
Of course the analysis in our paper is extremely simple. In a recent paper Dellink, Finus and Olieman (2006) , using a somewhat different approach to ours (the stability likelihood: how likely is it that a particular coalition of countries would form a stable IEA) explore the implications of uncertainty and learning in an empirical model of climate change using 12 world regions. Their model is rather richer than ours, for example allowing countries to chose from a continuum of abatement strategies, and using a wider range of uncertainties, with uncertainties about global damage costs, the share of global damages for each country (which is modeled in a way quite similar to our assumption of Individual Uncertainty), and abatement costs. They consider only Complete Learning and No Learning. For their base case they show that expected welfare with Complete Learning is lower than with No Learning, though in their alternative specification, with a lower mean value of global damage costs, they show that expected welfare with Complete Learning is higher than with No Learning. This would seem to confirm our finding that with Complete Learning the value of information may be positive or negative. However it is interesting to note that the reason that their alternative specification produces a positive value for information with Complete Learning is that in their No Learning case there is no stable coalition. In our model it is only in the Complete Learning case that there is a possibility that there is no stable IEA, and in such a case the value of information with Complete Learning is unambiguously negative. However we cite the Dellink et al (2006) paper to suggest that our conclusions about the impact of learning on IEA are not due just to the rather special features of our model. Smallest integer greater than or equal to 1/x V s (n)
Net benefits to a signatory when IEA has n members V f (n)
Net benefits to a non-signatory (fringe) when IEA has n members W(n)
Aggregate world benefit, summed over signatories and non-signatories, as a function of number of members of IEA, n l, h
Two With common uncertainty, critical value of probability for low damage state (l): * l n is stable iff p ≥ p crit (Eqn. 12) ) , ( h n n γ With individual uncertainty, mean γ for IEA with n signatories, n h of whom have high damage costs (Eqn. 14) ) (n n h
With individual uncertainty, minimum number of high damage cost countries in IEA of size n, that ensures signatories abate (Eqn. 14).
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